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Abstract. Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provide a new hard-
ware-based trusted execution environment on Intel CPUs using secure
enclaves that are resilient to accesses by privileged code and physical
attackers. Originally designed for securing small services, SGX bears
promise to protect complex, possibly cloud-hosted, legacy applications.
In this paper, we show that previously considered harmless synchroni-
sation bugs can turn into severe security vulnerabilities when using SGX.
By exploiting use-after-free and time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTTOU)
bugs in enclave code, an attacker can hijack its control flow or bypass
access control.
We present AsyncShock, a tool for exploiting synchronisation bugs of
multithreaded code running under SGX. AsyncShock achieves this by
only manipulating the scheduling of threads that are used to execute
enclave code. It allows an attacker to interrupt threads by forcing seg-
mentation faults on enclave pages. Our evaluation using two types of Intel
Skylake CPUs shows that AsyncShock can reliably exploit use-after-free
and TOCTTOU bugs.
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1 Introduction
Recently, Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX), a new hardware-supported
trusted execution environment for CPUs, has reached the mass market1. Sim-
ilarly to previous trusted execution environments such as ARM TrustZone [1],
1 https://qdms.intel.com/dm/i.aspx/5A160770-FC47-47A0-BF8A-062540456F0A/
PCN114074-00.pdf
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SGX allows the execution of applications inside secure enclaves, without trusting
other applications, the operating system (OS) or the boot process. Unlike previ-
ous solutions, SGX supports hardware multithreading, which is a fundamental
requirement for modern performant applications.
Secure enclaves reduce the overall trusted computing base (TCB) to essen-
tially the TCB of the enclave. SGX by itself, however, cannot prevent vulnera-
ble enclave applications from being exploited. Although it was initially assumed
that only small tailored applications would be executed inside enclaves [11], a
recent trend is to consider enclaves as a generic isolation environment for arbi-
trary applications: VC3 [21] uses enclaves to secure computation for the Hadoop
map/reduce framework; Haven [2] places a library OS inside an enclave for run-
ning unmodified Windows server applications.
This trend towards more complex, multi-threaded applications inside en-
claves opens up new attacks. In particular, existing applications are designed
to protect against a threat model that is not the same as the one for enclave
code—traditional applications assume that the OS is trusted. As recent work has
shown, an untrusted OS enables powerful side channel [28] and Iago [5] attacks.
In this paper, we explore a new angle for mounting attacks against SGX en-
claves. We show that synchronisation bugs that are unlikely to be exploitable out-
side of SGX become reliably exploitable by carefully scheduling enclave threads.
We achieve this by manipulating the page access permissions of enclave pages to
force segmentation faults that interrupt enclave execution. Through this method,
we are able to widen the traditionally small attack window of synchronisation
bugs and increase the chances of a successful exploit.
Typically, the impact of such concurrency attacks [29] is to prevent or slow
down certain activities in favour of others, create inconsistencies, extract data,
bypass access control, or hijack the control flow of the attacked program (e.g.,
CVE-2009-1837, CVE-2010-5298, CVE-2013-6444). In the case of SGX, the im-
pact of controlling code execution within an enclave is higher. At the time of
writing, Intel only licenses the creation of SGX production enclaves after ex-
amination of the software development practices of the licensee2. Controlling
enclave code execution would be a way to circumvent this practice, similarly to
how “jailbroken” iPhones can execute non-Apple approved applications.
The contributions of the paper are:
– we show that synchronisation bugs are easier to exploit within SGX enclaves
than in traditional applications. This is partly because, by design, the at-
tacker can control thread scheduling of enclaves in the SGX attacker model;
– we describe AsyncShock, a tool that facilitates the reliable and semi-auto-
mated exploitation of synchronisation bugs in SGX enclaves. AsyncShock
leverages the ability of the untrusted OS to arbitrarily interrupt and re-
schedule enclave threads. AsyncShock is designed to target enclaves built
with the official SGX Software Development Kit (SDK) for Linux3;
2 https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-sgx-product-licensing
3 https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2016/04/11/
intel-software-guard-extensions-sdk-for-linux-availability-update
http://www.digibib.tu-bs.de/?docid=00064029 01/11/2016
– we explain how to track enclave execution near critical sections by removing
permissions from pages, which triggers notifications when enclave execution
has reached a particular point;
– we show how use-after-free and TOCTTOU [3] bugs can be exploited by
AsyncShock; and
– we provide evaluation results of attack success rates by AsyncShock on cur-
rent Intel Skylake CPUs, exploring a variety of different implementations of
the attack.
The paper is structured as follows: §2 provides background on SGX, the
assumed attacker model and the impact of synchronisation bugs when using
SGX; §3 describes our forced segmentation fault approach and the AsyncShock
tool; §4 gives evaluation results and discusses protective measures; §5 surveys
related work on SGX and similar attacks; and §6 concludes the paper.
2 Background
First, we give a brief introduction to trusted execution as implemented by SGX.
After that, we present an attacker model that is tailored towards typical usage
scenarios of SGX. Finally, we discuss the impact of synchronisation bugs.
2.1 SGX in a Nutshell
SGX allows developers to create an isolated context inside their applications,
called a secure enclave [18, 13]. Enclaves feature multiple properties: (i) enclaves
are isolated from other untrusted applications (including higher-privileged ones)
through memory access control mechanisms enforced by the CPU; (ii) memory
encryption is used to defend against physical attacks and to secure swapped
out enclave pages; and (iii) enclaves support remote attestation at the level of
enclave instances.
Programming Model. A typical workflow for using SGX with the support of
the SGX SDK [12] starts with creating an enclave as part of an application.
The necessary instructions for creating an enclave are only callable from kernel
mode (ring 0) and thus require kernel support. Once successfully performed, the
application can issue Ecalls 1© to enter an enclave as seen in Figure 1. Inside the
enclave, input parameters passed with the call can be processed, and enclave code
is executed. Developers specify the enclave interface and the direction of data
with a SDK-specific file written in the Enclave Description Language (EDL) [12].
The SDK handles data movement across the enclave boundary by performing the
necessary memory copy operations. However, this is only supported for primitive
data types and flat structures. Data structures with pointers are not deep-copied
and therefore expose the enclave to TOCTTOU attacks.
Ocalls 2© may be performed to leave the enclave and execute untrusted
application code before an Ecall returns 3© to the enclave. While the enclave
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Fig. 1. Basic enclave interaction showing an Ecall 1© into an enclave, an Ocall 2©
and the return 3© to the untrusted application. (The enclave entry points are shown
in yellow.)
has access to inside and outside memory, the untrusted application is not allowed
to access memory inside the enclave: any attempt to read enclave data results
in abort page semantics, i.e. reading 0xFF; write attempts are simply ignored.
Memory Management. Enclave creation and its memory layout are handled by
an SGX kernel module. During enclave creation, the enclave code and data are
copied page-by-page into the Enclave Page Cache (EPC), which is protected
system memory. Mapped pages and their permissions are saved in the Enclave
Page Cache Map (EPCM). Enclave page permissions are thus managed twice,
once through the OS page table and once through the EPCM. Accessing an
enclave page also leads to two permissions checks: once by the Memory Man-
agement Unit (MMU) reading the permissions from the page table, and once by
SGX reading them from the EPCM. While it is possible to restrict page table
permissions further using mprotect, it is not possible to extend them because
the EPCM cannot be modified. The possibility of removing page permissions is
important for AsyncShock—it means that an attacker can mark pages and get
notified when they are used.
Support for Multithreading and Synchronisation Mechanisms. Each enclave must
have at least one entry point that defines an address at which the enclave may be
entered. The SDK implements a trampoline to allow multiple Ecalls through a
single entry point. Multithreading is supported by having multiple entry points
and permitting multiple threads to enter them concurrently. Similar to regular
applications, interrupts may occur during enclave execution and must be han-
dled. SGX achieves this by performing an Asynchronous Enclave Exit (AEX),
which saves the current processor state into enclave memory, leaves the enclave
and jumps to the Interrupt Service Routine (ISR). Enclave execution is resumed
after the ISR finishes, restoring the saved processor state.
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Fig. 2. Mutex lock/unlock operations provided by the SGX SDK may exit the enclave.
The SGX SDK offers synchronisation primitives such as mutexes and con-
dition variables. These primitives do not operate exclusively inside the enclave:
for instance, thread blocking requires a system call that is unavailable inside
enclaves. Furthermore, managing a lock variable outside of the enclave is not ad-
vised because an attacker could change it. A hybrid approach has been adopted
by Intel in which the lock variables are maintained inside the enclave whereas
system calls are issued outside. Therefore, using synchronisation primitives may
result in enclave exits. Figure 2 shows this behaviour for a mutex lock operation.
2.2 Attacker Model
We consider a typical attacker model for SGX enclaves: an attacker has full
control over the environment that starts and stops SGX enclaves. They have
full control of the OS and all code invoked prior to the transfer of control, using
Ecalls, to the SGX enclave, and also when an enclave calls outside code via
Ocalls. More specifically, the attacker can interrupt and resume SGX threads
(see §2.1), which is the main attack vector exploited in this paper.
The attacker’s goal is to compromise the confidentiality or integrity of the
SGX enclave. For example, they may want to gain the ability to execute arbitrary
code within the enclave. Note that we ignore availability threats, such as crashing
an enclave: the untrusted OS can simply stop SGX threads.
2.3 Synchronisation Bugs in Software
Synchronisation bugs are caused by the improper synchronised access of shared
data by multiple threads, and previous studies have shown that they are a
widespread issue [15, 27]. A large number of tools were proposed to help develop-
ers find different kinds of synchronisation bugs, such as atomicity violations [6,
8, 16], order violations [9, 17, 32] and data races [20, 31]. These studies, however,
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do not explore the security implications of discovered bugs—in most cases, the
discovered bugs lead to memory corruption or crashes. Although such bugs may
seem benign and unlikely to occur, synchronisation bugs are likely to lead to
exploitable security vulnerabilities [26, 7, 23].
Unlike traditional applications, in the context of SGX, enclave code is trusted
both by its developper and Intel to run untampered on untrusted machines (e.g.,
hosted at an untrusted cloud service provider). Memory corruption inside an en-
clave may therefore be used to hijack execution of the enclave, potentially leading
to the disclosure of enclave cryptographic keys. In addition, such vulnerabilities
may be used by malicious attackers, e.g., botnet herders, to bypass Intel’s vet-
ting process and design rootkits that run inside the enclave and are undetectable
by security software running in the OS: by design, the OS cannot introspect an
enclave running in production mode. Therefore, vulnerabilities in enclaves are
worrisome to enclave developpers, enclave hosters, and Intel.
In the following, we show that synchronisation bugs are a real security threat
to enclave developers by exploiting two examples of the common atomicity-
violation bugs: a use-after-free bug as well as a TOCTTOU bug.
3 Exploiting Synchronisation Bugs with Scheduler Control
Exploiting synchronisation bugs inside an SGX enclave can be broken down into:
(i) finding an exploitable synchronisation bug; (ii) providing a way to interrupt
and schedule enclave threads; and (iii) determining experimentally when to inter-
rupt and schedule enclave threads. Next we describe each of these steps through
the example of a use-after-free bug. In addition, we describe the AsyncShock tool,
which generalises this approach and allow the easy adaptation of these steps to
other vulnerabilities. We explain how AsyncShock exploits a TOCTTOU bug.
3.1 Exploiting Synchronisation Bugs inside an Enclave
We focus on the atomicity-violation class of bugs and show how such a bug can
be exploited. Figure 3 shows an example of an atomicity violation. A possible
use-after-free bug occurs if the first thread is interrupted directly after the free
but before the assignment. The second thread performs a NULL check during this
time, which succeeds even though the pointer has been freed. The call to free
and the assignment were intended to be an atomic block by developer, but this
is not reflected in the implementation.
During execution, such an interruption is a scheduling decision by the OS,
and the probability that the interruption occurs at the right point is low. Fur-
thermore, the thread itself is not paused but is scheduled again later while the
second thread is still executing. The second thread may thus be interrupted
during its execution before the freed pointer can be used.
As shown in the litterature [29, 25], the attack window for memory races is
small in practice. In some cases, the attacker may only have a single chance to
exploit the vulnerability. Even if an attacker can execute the application many
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1 . . .
2 free(pointer);
3 // thread is not active
4 // between those two
5 // statements
6 pointer = NULL;
7 . . .
Thread 1
1 . . .
2 . . .
3 if (pointer != NULL) {
4 // use pointer
5 }
6 . . .
7 . . .
Thread 2
Fig. 3. Simple use-after-free. Thread one frees pointer but is not able to set it to NULL
because thread two is scheduled in.
times, it may still take a long time until the interruption occurs at precisely
the correct time. Being able to increase the attack window would thus help
exploit such bugs more effectively. The AsyncShock tool aims to help exploit
synchronisation bugs that are present inside an enclave by pausing and resuming
threads during execution, which is possible when threads are inside an SGX
enclave. We explore two techniques for interrupting threads, as described in the
following sections.
3.2 Interrupting Threads via Linux Signals
One approach to interrupt threads is to leverage the Linux signal subsystem.
Handling a signal interrupts the thread and redirects control to the signal han-
dler. We therefore register a signal handler for the SIGUSR1 and SIGUSR2 signals.
We use the SIGUSR1 signal to pause a thread and the SIGUSR2 signal to resume it
again. A control thread sends these signals to specific threads based on a config-
urable delay. Elapsed time since the application start is measured and compared
to the delay in a loop. When the delay is reached, a signal is issued. The signal
is sent by the pthread_kill function provided by pthreads.
Pausing the thread is performed by using a condition variable to wait inside
the signal handler that suspends the thread. Sending the resume signal causes a
second signal handler invocation, which in turn uses a condition variable signal to
resolve the wait in the first signal handler’s invocation. Each thread has its own
condition variable, facilitating the pausing and resuming of multiple threads.
While this approach works, it is unreliable and depends on the specifics of the
Linux task scheduler. We experimented with different delays for the same exploit
but observed the same success rate regardless of the delay. We suspect that the
signal dispatching is too slow, leading to inaccurate interruptions. Furthermore,
this approach requires a deterministic runtime of the program because the delay
is fixed—non-deterministic execution inside the enclave defeats this approach.
3.3 Interrupting Threads via Forced Segmentation Faults
We explore another approach based on interrupting threads to force segmen-
tation faults. Using mprotect, we remove the “read” and “execute” permissions
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Fig. 4. Memory access permission checks on an enclave page. Permissions are checked
and managed twice: once by the MMU (page table) and once by SGX (EPCM).
from enclave pages, i.e. marking the page. As soon as an enclave page with
stripped permissions is accessed, a SIGSEGV signal is dispatched by the kernel
as a response to the fault generated by the MMU, notifying the attacker of the
page access.
This approach exploits the fact that memory access checks with SGX are
performed twice, as shown in Figure 4. The call to mprotect changes the per-
missions inside the page table, but not inside the EPCM. Therefore the access
fails at the page table check, even though the real permissions are unchanged.
We install our own signal handler, as described in §3.2, but this time for
SIGSEGV. Inside the handler, we can restore the page permissions, start a timer
with a configurable delay and resume execution. If a timer is started, it can
remove the permissions upon expiration. This leads to another SIGSEGV, which
again invokes our handler. We can now employ the same thread stopping mecha-
nism described for the signal approach using condition variables. The mprotect
approach is more reliable than the signal approach because page permissions are
changed instantaneously.
3.4 AsyncShock Tool
AsyncShock incorporates the described approaches into an easy-to-use tool. It is
implemented as a shared library, which is preloaded using the LD_PRELOAD mech-
anism of the dynamic linker. To interact with the target application, AsyncShock
provides its own implementation of certain functions that shadow their real im-
plementations. An example is pthread_create, which is normally provided by
the C standard library. AsyncShock provides its own implementation that ob-
serves thread creation and takes actions upon the creation of specific threads.
To use AsyncShock, an attacker must know how the scheduling needs to
be influenced to successfully trigger an exploit. They then must transform the
attack into a series of actions in reaction to certain events. Possible events in-
clude thread creation, segmentation faults and timer expirations; possible actions
include pausing or resuming a thread, starting a timer or changing page permis-
sions. We call this series of actions the attack playbook. AsyncShock enforces
that the targeted application behaves according to the playbook while also ma-
nipulating the environment.
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1 on thread creation "thread1":
2 remove read ,exec on enclave +0x5000
3
4 on thread creation "thread2":
5 pause thread this
6
7 on segfault 1:
8 set read ,exec on enclave +0 x5000
9 remove read ,exec on enclave +0x1000
10
11 on segfault 2:
12 set read ,exec on enclave +0 x1000
13 resume thread thread2
14 pause thread this
Listing 1.1. Example playbook for the use-after-free bug from Figure 3.
A textual representation of a playbook for the use-after-free bug from Figure 3
is given in Listing 1.1. It includes the definition of four reactions to events: on
thread creation of the first thread, an enclave page (enclave base address +
0x5000) is stripped of its read and execute permissions. By using objdump, we
find that the free function is located on this code page, and we mark it to
get notified when it is called. As soon as a thread calls the free function, a
segmentation fault occurs, which is handled by the signal handler registered by
AsyncShock. It reapplies the removed permissions and removes the permissions
at another page. The marked page contains the calling function that we mark
to get notified when free finishes.
The resulting segmentation fault is again handled by AsyncShock. This time,
the faulting thread is paused, and the second thread is allowed to continue. As
a result, the attack window has been widened for the second thread to exploit
the bug.
3.5 AsyncShock in Action
We use AsyncShock to successfully exploit a use-after-free bug inside an en-
clave and take control of the instruction pointer. Listing 1.2 shows the exploited
enclave code.
The code contains two Ecalls, one set-up Ecall only executed once and
another Ecall. While the enclave contains no threads, the second Ecall is used
by two untrusted threads to enter the enclave simultaneously. However, a syn-
chronisation bug exists between lines 26 and 27 if multiple threads execute the
Ecall function in line 19. glob_str_ptr is a shared variable between all execu-
tions that is freed inside the Ecall and set to NULL. The bug triggers if a thread
has just executed the free but not yet the assignment, while a second thread
enters the Ecall function. Due to the nature of the memory allocator provided
by the SDK, the malloc call (line 20) provides the old glob_str_ptr address,
which leads to glob_str_ptr and my_func_ptr pointing to the same memory.
The second thread passes the NULL check and copies the user provided input
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1 char *glob_str_ptr;
2
3 int other_functions(const char *c) { /* do other things */ }
4
5 int puts(const char * c) {
6 printf("%s", c);
7 return 0;
8 }
9
10 struct my_func_ptr {
11 int (* my_puts) (const char *);
12 char desc [8];
13 } my_func_ptr;
14
15 void ecall_setup () {
16 glob_str_ptr = malloc(sizeof(struct my_func_ptr));
17 }
18
19 void ecall_print_and_save_arg_once(void *str) {
20 struct my_func_ptr *mfp = malloc(sizeof(struct my_func_ptr));
21 mfp ->my_puts = puts;
22 if (glob_str_ptr != NULL) {
23 memcpy(glob_str_ptr , (char *)str , sizeof(glob_str_ptr));
24 glob_str_ptr[sizeof(glob_str_ptr)] = ’\0’;
25 mfp ->my_puts(glob_str_ptr);
26 free(glob_str_ptr);
27 glob_str_ptr = NULL;
28 }
29 free(mfp);
30 }
Listing 1.2. Example enclave containing a user-after-free bug.
to glob_str_ptr, which sets my_func_ptr. The function call in line 25 now re-
ceives its address from the user-provided input and can be given the address of
another enclave function, thus hijacking the control flow inside the enclave.
We use AsyncShock with a playbook similar to the one shown in Listing 1.1
to exploit the bug. Figure 5 shows how AsyncShock exploits the bug in detail.
AsyncShock lies dormant until one of its overwritten functions are called. The
application first creates a thread that is paused immediately by AsyncShock 1©.
A second thread is created that is allowed to execute 2©. At this point, the
“read” and “execute” permissions are removed from the code page containing
the free function. The second thread enters the enclave and begins execution.
When it calls free 3©, an access violation occurs, resulting in an AEX and a
segmentation fault caught by AsyncShock 4©. The permissions are restored for
this page, but removed for another before the thread is allowed to continue.
When the next marked page is hit 5©, resulting in another AEX and seg-
mentation fault 6©, we know that free has returned. In the signal handler, the
permissions are restored again. We stop the thread and signal the sleeping thread
to execute 7©. This concludes the successful exploit.
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Fig. 5. AsyncShock exploiting the synchronisation bug from Listing 1.2
3.6 AsyncShock and a TOCTTOU Bug
To show how AsyncShock can be adapted to a different type of bug, we exploit
a TOCTTOU bug. Listing 1.3 shows an enclave with three Ecalls: two threads
enter the enclave, the first through the ecall_writer_thread and the second
through the ecall_checker_thread Ecall. The second thread checks (line 20)
if the shared variable data contains the string "bad data" and, if so, does not
access it. Other content leads to a successful check and results in the second use
of the variable. The first thread writes to the shared variable after executing a
non-deterministic amount of time.
A TOCTTOU bug exists in lines 18 (check) and 19 (use). AsyncShock ex-
ploits this bug by delaying the writer thread, interrupting enclave execution after
the check and then letting the writer thread proceed with the write to the shared
variable. Interrupting between the check and the use in this example is challeng-
ing because the code pages containing strncmp and memcpy also contain some
frequently called methods of the SDK. We therefore opt to start a timer right
before entering the enclave, which expires between the check and the use. The
timer has a configureable delay that postpones its execution. The correct delay
must be determined empirically by observing the behaviour of the application
with different delays. In our example, we observe the most successful exploits by
choosing delays between 80000 and 120000 cycles, as described in §4.3.
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1 static char data[] = {’g’, ’o’, ’o’, ’d’, ’ ’, ’d’, ’a’, ’t’, ’a’, ’\0’};
2 static int random_wait = 0;
3
4 void ecall_setup () {
5 random_wait = get_random_int ();
6 }
7
8 void ecall_writer_thread () {
9 //This function has a constant delay >> check + use plus a random delay
10 //to simulate complex execution that takes a non -deterministic amount of time
11 for (int i = 0; i < 100000; ++i);
12 for (int j = 0; j < random_wait; ++j);
13 snprintf(data , 10, "bad data");
14 }
15
16 int ecall_checker_thread () {
17 char *str = calloc(1, 10);
18 if (strncmp("bad data", data , 9) != 0) {
19 memcpy(str , data , 10);
20 printf("Access ok: %s\n", str);
21 free(str);
22 return 0;
23 } else {
24 printf("Sorry , no access !\n");
25 return -1;
26 }
27 }
Listing 1.3. Example enclave containing a TOCTTOU bug.
4 Evaluation
To show the effectiveness of AsyncShock, we evaluate it by exploiting two atom-
icity violation bugs. First, we describe our evaluation set-up. After that, we
present the results of exploiting a use-after-free bug and a TOCTTOU bug in-
side an enclave. We finish with a discussion of possible defenses.
4.1 Experimental Set-up
We evaluate the effectiveness of AsyncShock by exploiting a use-after-free bug,
as well as a TOCTTOU bug, on real SGX hardware. We used a Dell Opti-
plex 7040 with an i7-6700 Intel CPU and 24 GB of memory. We also evaluate
AsyncShock on a white-box server with an Intel E3-1230v5 CPU and 32 GB of
memory. Both CPUs have four cores and are capable of hyper-threading, dou-
bling the possible active threads. For our evaluation, hyper-threading has not
been disabled. The desktop machine runs Ubuntu Linux 14.04.3 Desktop with
kernel version 3.19.0-49; the server machine runs Ubuntu Linux 14.04.4 Server
with kernel version 3.13.0-85. The server machine has a lower base load because
fewer processes exist due to the missing desktop environment. All evaluations
use a pre-release version of the SGX SDK which Intel provided to us.
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Fig. 6. Graph showing the success rate of AsyncShock exploiting the TOCTTOU bug
at different timer delays.
4.2 Exploiting a Use-After-Free Bug
First, we establish a baseline by running the application without AsyncShock.
We execute the application with its enclave one million times without observing
a single successful exploit. We conclude that the attack window is too small to
be exploitable just through controlled input.
We exploit the bug shown in Listing 1.2. Given the playbook from Listing 1.1,
we can reliably exploit the use-after-free bug. We also modify the playbook to
change the function arguments for the second thread so that the use-after-free
results in a control flow modification, i.e. a call to other_function, which is
otherwise not called. We execute the exploit 100000 times on both machines and
observe a 100% success rate.
4.3 Exploiting a TOCTOU Bug
To put the high rate chance of exploiting the use-after-free bug into perspective,
we also consider a more difficult bug to exploit reliably: a TOCTTOU bug inside
an enclave. Here we exploit the enclave code shown in Listing 1.3. We also
establish a baseline by executing the application without AsyncShock. As with
the use-after-free bug, we also do not see a single exploit occurring by chance.
The non-deterministic delay in the writer thread is long enough so that the other
thread can always perform the check and the use on the same data.
Next, we try to exploit the bug with AsyncShock. We evaluate a wide range
of delays for the timer, as described in §3.6. Each delay is executed 10000 times.
We record the successful exploits every 100 executions, obtaining 100 result sets
per delay. We report the mean success rate for a given delay, with error bars
representing a 95% confidence interval.
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Delay Success rate
(cycles) Server Desktop
80,000 98.57% ± 0.27 99.40% ± 0.17
90,000 99.81% ± 0.08 99.93% ± 0.05
100,000 99.99% ± 0.02 99.99% ± 0.03
110,000 99.98% ± 0.03 99.99% ± 0.02
120,000 99.98% ± 0.03 99.98% ± 0.03
Table 1. Deatiled success rates for selected delays.
Figure 6 shows the results for the TOCTTOU exploit. As can be seen, the
success rate varies not only with timer delay, but also differs for both machines
with the same delay. We attribute this behaviour to the differences in base load
and active processes on both machines. We are able to achieve near 100% success
rates with timer delays of 80,000 cycles to 120,000 cycles. (As explained in §3.3,
the delay is the time until AsyncShock removes the “execute” permissions from
an enclave page, effectively forcing a stop to execution.) Our goal is to stop the
enclave between the check and the use, which we achieve almost always with the
correct delay.
Table 4.3 shows the results in more detail for selected delays. With a delay of
100,000, AsyncShock can almost always exploit the TOCTTOU bug with a low
deviation. In conclusion, AsyncShock can be used to reliably exploit atomicity
violation bugs with a high success rate.
4.4 Protective Measures Against AsyncShock
Our experimental results show that synchronisation bugs can lead to viable
attacks against SGX enclaves. However, there already exist defense mechanisms
for protecting from these attacks.
A first defence against the use-after-free bug is the sanitisation of user input
as AsyncShock changes the Ecall parameters to direct the control flow. In gen-
eral, sanitisation is advisable when unexpected input can be abused in a similar
way to Iago attacks [5]. Enclave code should always check outside input for va-
lidity as an attacker may change the result from Ocalls or the parameters to
Ecalls when using the SDK. In addition, enclave developers should not rely on
the SDK’s ability to defend against simple TOCTTOU attacks. While the SDK
does copy Ecall parameters into enclave memory before passing them to enclave
functions, it does not deep-copy data structures. Pointers in data structures are
not followed and may lead to an enclave accessed outside memory. This type of
vulnerability has often been exploited in OS kernels (e.g., [14] for Windows, and
in general in filesystems [25]).
Another defense against the use-after-free bug presented here is possible be-
cause the bug relies on the in-enclave implementation of malloc to return re-
cently freed memory. The attack can be mitigated by heap hardening meth-
ods, such as the one recently implemented in Internet Explorer through delayed
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free [10], or even with tools such as AddressSanitizer [22] that delay the reuse of
recently freed memory or by changing the behaviour of the in-enclave memory
allocator.
Protection from all synchronisation bugs can be achieved by prohibiting
threading altogether—if only a single thread can enter the enclave at any time,
no inconsistencies are possible due to serial execution. Such a solution, however,
negatively impacts performance. If parallelism is needed, one can also adapt
other techniques to work inside enclaves such as Stable Multithreading [30] or
use tools such as ThreadSanitizer [23] during development in order to find and
eliminate synchronisation bugs.
While many hardening techniques are applicable to enclave code, some tra-
ditional techniques do not work in the context of SGX. For example, the use of
address space layout randomisation (ASLR) [19] is not directly applicable inside
enclaves because any changes of the enclave memory would change the enclave
measurement and therefore fail the signature check.
5 Related Work
Because SGX is a new technology with limited production use, only few use
cases have been described so far. Haven [2] executes unmodified Windows appli-
cations inside an enclave. To achieve this, the combination of a shield module
and a library OS provides the necessary execution support. The shield module
manages synchronisation primitives and ensures their correct behaviour, simi-
lar to the SGX SDK. Furthermore, Haven tries to defend against Iago attacks
be sanitising and checking the parameters of Ecalls and results of Ocalls.
Haven also proposes a decoupling of enclave threads and host threads via user-
level scheduling to hinder the exploitation of synchronisation bugs. However,
AsyncShock should still be effective as it marks pages in close proximity to the
synchronisation bugs to force an AEX. Thus, it does not necessarily need to
observe the enclave-internal thread scheduling.
Fine-grained page tracking can be used for powerful side channel attacks [28].
For example, a JPEG image generated inside an enclave could be reconstructed
outside: by paging out enclave pages to repeatedly induce page faults, mem-
ory accesses could be related to certain code paths. In contrast, AsyncShock is
geared towards the exploitation of synchronisation bugs, albeit it can also be
used to extract information from an enclave. However, for synchronisation bugs,
AsyncShock only needs a small number of marker pages to track the enclave
execution close to the critical section.
Yang et al. [29] identify concurrency attacks as a risk to real-world systems.
They classify different types of attacks based on memory access patterns, and
identify the attack window as an important factor for exploitability. Memory
races usually have a small attack window at the level of nanoseconds. Async-
Shock widens the attack window by stopping threads when a critical state is
reached, steering other activities to allow reliable exploitation of memory-based
concurrency bugs.
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Synchronisation bugs have also been studied for their security implications.
For instance, TOCTTOU races often affect filesystem-related code, typically
when performing access control decisions. Dean and Hu [7] propose a counter-
measure to alleviate those risks. Borisov et al. [4] show that this probabilistic
countermeasure can be reliably defeated with filesystem mazes. Tsafrir et al. [25]
propose another way to instrument those access checks to make the exploitation
of those races significantly more difficult even against filesystem mazes.
Twiz and Sgrakkyu [26] extensively treat techniques for the exploitation of
logical bugs in OS kernels. Jurczyk and Coldwind [14] describe how to exploit
race conditions via memory access patterns in the Windows kernel. The Windows
kernel copies the arguments to system calls from user to kernel space. However,
the kernel does not copy pointer-referenced data in some cases. The authors
exploit this by using the Bochs CPU emulator to interrupt the kernel, similar to
how AsyncShock swaps out the data between two reads by the kernel—a classical
TOCTTOU attack. However, in contrast, AsyncShock attacks an SGX enclave
and not the kernel, in a setting where the attacker controls the scheduler and
has reliable side channels on a thread’s progress.
Moat [24] makes a first step towards the verification of SGX enclaves. The
authors propose an approach to verify that enclave code is unable to disclose
secrets. They employ static analysis on the x86 machine code, introducing “ghost
variables” to track the secrecy of data in a manner similar to taint tracking.
With this method, they are able to find occurrences of possible sensitive data
disclosure. While their approach is promising for detecting data disclosure, they,
unlike AsyncShock, do not consider multi-threaded code in enclaves.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyses the impact of synchronisation bugs inside SGX enclaves. We
have shown that the impact of synchronisation bugs is greater within SGX en-
claves than in traditional applications, because their exploitation becomes highly
reliable through attacker-controlled scheduling. We described AsyncShock, a tool
for thread manipulation, and showed how it can be used to exploit synchronisa-
tion bugs by widening the attack window through controlled thread pausing and
resuming. AsyncShock operates as a preloaded library without modifications of
the target application or host OS. We demonstrated that synchronisation bugs
can be exploited inside SGX enclaves using AsyncShock for control flow hijacking
or bypassing access checks.
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